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On August 28, 1990, the day after she moved from Myrtle 
Beach, South Carolina to Northampton, Massachusetts, Jane Rini 
woke up and began unpacking her household belongings which had 
been transported to her new home by United Van Lines 
("United"). When she opened a box that United's packers had la­
beled with the title "artwork," she discovered it was empty. Later 
in the day, she discovered that another box, labeled by the packers 
as "Orange Box 77" and designated by them as containing artwork, 
was not in her new home. When all of the boxes were unpacked, 
Ms. Rini discovered that eleven pieces of valuable art that had been 
in her family for generations were missing.1 
United never located Ms. Rini's lost artwork; in fact, it appar­
ently never looked for it. United also denied Ms. Rini any financial 
* Lawyering Process Instructor, Western New England College School of Law. 
J.D., 1993, Western New England College School of Law; M.S., 1985, B.A., 1976, State 
University of New York at Buffalo. The author was an associate at the Northhampton, 
Massachusetts firm of Fierst and Pucci, and assisted in writing the appellate brief for the 
plaintiff in Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 
51 (1997). 
1. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 224, 226-27 (D. Mass. 1995), 
rev'd, 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 51 (1997). 
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compensation whatsoever for losing her valuable belongings.2 Ms. 
Rini followed United's procedure for filing a claim, but the com­
pany denied it in its entirety.3 Throughout the claims process, and 
the ensuing trial, United asserted multiple and conflicting defenses. 
First, it suggested that Ms. Rini never provided the company 
with her artwork before she moved.4 United then contended that 
even if it had received the artwork, it had delivered it to Ms. Rini in 
her Northampton home.5 Next, United claimed that it was immate­
rial whether or not it lost the artwork, because Ms. Rini could not 
prove how much the items were worth since she had no receipts for 
objects that had been in her family for generations.6 United rea­
soned that since Ms. Rini could not prove the worth of the lost 
items with exactitude, she was not entitled to compensation.7 Fi­
nally, when Ms. Rini submitted photographs of the missing items to 
professional art appraisers, who placed a value on all of the missing 
items, United again rejected her claim altogether, stating that it did 
not accept appraisals based on photographs.8 
In December of 1992, after almost two and a half years of 
fighting with United to no avail, Ms. Rini brought suit in the United 
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.9 After a 
trial in which United "offer[ed] any argument theoretically avail­
able, regardless of its basis in fact,"10 a jury awarded her $50,000 to 
compensate her for the artwork whose value United said was im­
possible to assess.!1 The jury also awarded Ms. Rini $100,000 to 
compensate her for the injuries she suffered as a result of United's 
negligence and misrepresentations during the two and a half year 
claims process.!2 Characterizing United's behavior during the 
2. See id. at 228. 
3. See id. at 227-28. 
4. See id. at 230. 
5. See id. at 228, 230. 
6. See id. at 227,230. 
7. See id. at 227 (explaining that United's demands for documentation were a 
deliberate "sham to justify denial of a valid claim"). 
8. See id. at 227, 230. 
9. See id. at 229. United tried to thwart Ms. Rini's lawsuit before it began by 
bringing a Declaratory Judgment Action in the United States District Court for the 
District of South Carolina before she filed suit in Massachusetts. United's suit was 
dismissed by the district court in South Carolina as an improper use of the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. See id. 
10. Id. It should be noted that the defenses asserted by United during the claims 
process were reasserted at trial. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text for a dis­
cussion of these defenses. 
11. See Rini, 903 F. Supp. at 231. 
12. See id. 
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claims process as "a sham designed to wear plaintiff down and force 
her to abandon a legitimate claim,"13 the trial judge found for Ms. 
Rini on her claim under chapter 93A of the General Laws of Mas­
sachusetts14 and tripled her damages.15 He also awarded attorneys' 
fees and costs, resulting in a total judgment of $504,309.16 
Ms. Rini's period of vindication was short. Upon appeal by 
United, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
determined that all of Ms. Rini's common law and state statutory 
claims were preempted by a federal statute commonly known as the 
Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act.17 The 
court found that Ms. Rini's only remedy against United was com­
pensation for the actual value of her missing items. Thus, Ms. 
Rini's recovery was limited to the $50,000 the jury determined her 
artwork was worth, the same amount that she was owed on the day 
she first filed her administrative claim with United in 1990.18 
In so deciding, the First Circuit aligned itself with other circuit 
courts that have considered the matter of Carmack preemption.19 
As a result of the uniform decisions of the circuit courts on this 
matter, the moving industry in the United States has immunity for 
any deceptive, careless, or deliberately dishonest acts in which it 
chooses to engage. No matter how egregious the behavior of a 
moving company in processing a consumer's claim, the company's 
13. Id. at 232. 
14. Section 2 of chapter 93A bars parties doing business in Massachusetts from 
engaging in unfair and deceptive acts. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (1996). Sec­
tion 9 of chapter 93A provides remedies for consumers victimized by such acts, includ­
ing recovering of double or treble damages. See id. § 9. Chapter 93A claims are 
equitable in nature and are resolved by the court, not a jury. See W. Oliver Tripp Co. v. 
American Hoeschst Corp., 616 N.E.2d 118, 125 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993). 
15. See Rini, 903 F. Supp. at 233. 
16. See id. at 239. 
17. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. 
Ct. 51 (1997). In 1926, the Carmack Amendment became codified at 49 U.S.c. 
§ 20(11). At the time of Ms. Rini's claim, it was codified at 49 U.S.c. §§ 10103, 10730 
and 11707. In late 1995, Congress passed legislation abolishing the Interstate Com­
merce Commission as of January 1, 1996. See ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-88, 109 Stat. 804 (1995). Under the new legislation, the Surface Transportation 
Board has jurisdiction over carriers of household goods. See 49 U.S.c. § 702 (Supp. I. 
1995). The issues presented in the Rini case remain vital because the new legislation 
preserves the Carmack Amendment in the same form as the prior legislation. See 49 
U.S.c. § 14706(a), (f) (Supp. I. 1995). 
18. Since the trial judge also determined that Ms. Rini was entitled to an award of 
attorneys' fees, pursuant to provisions of the Carmack Amendment, see Rini, 903 F. 
Supp. at 236, Ms. Rini will also be entitled to that portion of her fees that is attributable 
to her recovery under the Carmack Amendment. 
19. See cases cited infra note 24. 
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liability will be limited to the actual value of the lost or missing 
items. 
This Article addresses both the underpinnings and the merits 
of this outcome. After discussing the general principles of preemp­
tion, Part I describes the history, purpose and language of the Car­
mack Amendment and demonstrates that at the time the 
amendment was passed, Congress had no intention of preempting 
claims based on moving industry misconduct such as occurred in 
Ms. Rini's case. Part II discusses the constitutional principles that 
govern application of the law of federal preemption and describes 
how application of preemption in Carmack Amendment cases has 
diverged from the overall application of preemption principles in 
other areas of congressional legislation. This section views Rini in 
context with the overall view of preemption law taken by the courts 
in similar situations. Finally, Part III argues that the courts have 
improperly granted the moving industry carte blanche to deceive 
and mistreat consumers without consequence, and suggests con­
gressional action to solve this problem. 




At the time that Ms. Rini moved from South Carolina to Mas­
sachusetts, the Carmack Amendment consisted of the following 
three provisions:20 
A common carrier providing transportation or service subject. to 
the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission ... shall 
issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for trans­
20. When the Carmack Amendment was passed in 1906, it read, in relevant part, 
as follows: 
That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company receiving prop­
erty for transportation from a point in one State to a point in another State 
shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor and shall be liable to the lawful 
holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or 
by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such 
property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property may pass, 
and no contract receipt, rule, or regulation shall exempt such common carrier, 
railroad, or transportation company from the liability hereby imposed: Pro­
vided, That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of such receipt or 
bill of lading of any remedy or right of action which he has under existing law. 
Interstate Commerce Regulations, ch. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 593,595 (1906) (codified with 
some differences in language at 49 V.S.c. § 20(11) (1926)) (repealed 1978). Section 
20(11) was repealed in 1978 by Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(b), 92 Stat. 1466, but the Inter­
state Commerce Act was reenacted as positive law by the same statute. See Interstate 
Commerce Act and Related Laws, Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1337 (1978). 
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portation .... That carrier ... [is] liable to the person entitled to 
recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed 
under the paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the prop­
erty ....21 
The Interstate Commerce Commission may require or authorize 
a carrier ... providing transportation or service subject to its ju­
risdiction . . . to establish rates for transportation of property 
under which the liability of the carrier for that property is limited 
to a value established by written declaration of the shipper, or by 
written agreement, when that value would be reasonable under 
. the circumstances surrounding the transportation.22 
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, the remedies pro­
vided under this subtitle are in addition to remedies existing 
under another law or at common law.23 
It is evident from the language of the statute, that interstate 
carriers were required to issue a bill of lading when accepting goods 
for transportation and that if the goods were lost or damaged in the 
course of transportation, the initial carrier was responsible for com­
pensating the shipper in the amount of the actual value of the 
goods, unless the parties had agreed to limit liability. Ms. Rini, in 
her lawsuit, asserted claims not just for the loss of her goods, but for 
the emotional injuries she endured as a result of the protracted and 
futile claims process with United. Thus, the essential question for 
the Rini court, as well as other federal courts of appeal that had 
considered similar cases,24 was whether state common law and stat­
utory claims that relate to injuries separate and distinct from the 
actual loss of goods were preempted by the federal statute outlined 
above. . 
A. Principles of Preemption 
The basic principles of federal preemption are well settled. 
"Consideration under the Supremacy Clause [of the United States 
Constitution] starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not 
intend to displace state law."25 State law is paramount, unless, and 
21. 49 u.~c. § 11707(a)(1) (1994). 
22. Id. § 10730(a). 
23. Id. § 10103. 
24. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Beltman N. Am. Co., 30 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 1994); Moffit 
v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1993); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. North Am. 
Van Lines, Inc., 970 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1992); Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 
1407 (7th Cir. 1987); W.D. Lawson & Co. v. Penn Cent. Co., 456 F.2d 419 (6th Cir. 
1972). 
25. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). 
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only to the extent that, Congress unmistakably expresses its intent 
to usurp it.26 "[T]he historic police powers of the States [are] not to 
be superseded by [federal law] unless that was the clear and mani­
fest purpose of Congress."27 
In the absence of express congressional command, state law is 
preempted only when Congress evidences an intent to exclude it by 
legislating so pervasively on a subject that it occupies the field and 
leaves no room for state regulation or when state law conflicts di­
rectly with federal law, making it impossible to comply with both.28 
"[F]or a state law to fall within the pre-empted zone, it must have 
some direct and substantial effect" on the area that Congress 
sought to regulate.29 
There is no explicit preemption provision in the Carmack 
Amendment.3D Indeed, the only reference to state law contained in 
the text of the Carmack Amendment is the proviso that "[ e ]xcept as 
otherwise provided in this subtitle, the remedies provided under 
this subtitle are in addition to remedies existing under another law 
or at common law."31 Thus, shippers should be entitled to state 
common law and statutory remedies for injuries separate and apart 
from the loss of their goods, unless, despite including this savings 
clause, Congress "clear[ly] and manifest[ly]" expressed its intent to 
supersede these claims by either entirely occupying the field of 
shipper-carrier relations or by creating a direct clash between state 
and federallaw.32 
B. Congressional Intent Behind the Carmack Amendment 
When the Carmack Amendment was enacted by Congress in 
1906, it was not accompanied by any legislative history.33 Nonethe­
less, Congress's intent may be gleaned from an examination of the 
text and decided United States Supreme Court cases surrounding 
its enactment. These sources support the conclusion that Congress 
intended to resolve specific difficulties that had arisen in the arena 
of interstate transit of goods due to the existence of diverse state 
26. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
27. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
28. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
29. Id. at 85. 
30. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
31. 49 U.S.c. § 10103 (1994). 
32. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
33. See 40 CONGo REc. 7075 (1906) (indicating that no committee considered the 
amendment). 
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laws. These laws, however, had nothing to do with shipper com­
plaints of carrier misconduct in the claims process or any other as­
pect of the shipper-carrier relationship. 
Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Hughes ,34 decided three years before 
the enactment of the Carmack Amendment, involved a contract be­
tween a shipper and a railroad carrier for shipment of a horse. The 
shipper agreed that in exchange for a reduced rate of shipment, the 
carrier would be responsible for only a limited monetary loss if the 
horse was lost or damaged in transit. This agreement was valid 
under the laws of New York, where it was made. However, the 
horse was destined for Pennsylvania, a state that did not enforce 
contractual limitations on liability because of its internal public pol­
icy. The shipper sued successfully in Pennsylvania for the full value 
of his horse, which was injured on the railroad tracks after arriving 
in Philadelphia.35 
In the United States Supreme Court, the carrier objected that 
such state interference in its practices was a violation of the Inter­
state Commerce Act. The Court disagreed, declaring that while the 
Act covered many areas of interstate commerce, Congress had not 
legislated on the precise matter in controversy.36 Since Congress 
had not expressed any intention with respect to the validity of con­
tracts between shippers and carriers to limit carrier liability for loss 
or damage to goods, the Court held that state law remained control­
ling. Consequently, the shipper in Hughes was permitted to recover 
the full amount of his loss resulting from the injury to his horse 
pursuant to Pennsylvania law, despite the previously agreed to limi­
tation.37 The Court invited a congressional response to its opinion 
in Hughes by noting the absence of legislation on the matter.38 
Three years later, Congress took up the invitation and passed 
the Carmack AmendmenP9 The amendment provided a federal 
scheme of carrier liability for goods lost or damaged in interstate 
transit by placing responsibility for the goods with the initial carrier 
and by providing that the terms of the bill of lading issued by the 
initial carrier controlled the transaction.40 
34. 191 U.S. 477 (1903). 
35. See id. at 478-80. 
36. See id. at 488. 
37. See id. 
38. See id. at 49l. 
39. Interstate Commerce Regulations, ch. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 593, 595 (1906) (re­
pealed 1978). See supra note 20 for original text of the amendment. 
40. See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 504 (1913) (defining the 
"significant and dominating features" of the Carmack Amendment). 
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This legislation was a direct response to the Supreme Court's 
decision in Hughes, which had continued the uncertainty regarding 
the validity of contractual limitations on liability depending on 
where a shipment originated and its final destination. This interpre­
tation of the amendment was confirmed in the first case to examine 
it in detail, Adams Express Co. v. Croninger.41 
Adams Express Co. involved a bill of lading "in all essentials 
identical" to the one at issue in Hughes .42 In Adams Express Co., 
the shipper of a diamond ring lost in transit attempted to recover 
the full value of the ring, although he had previously contracted to 
limit the carrier's liability for the ring to fifty dollars in exchange for 
a lower shipping COSt.43 The shipper relied on Kentucky's common 
law permitting him to recover the full amount of his loss despite the 
contractual agreement contained in the bill of lading.44 The Court 
determined that the rule of law announced in Hughes, that would 
have permitted the shipper's full recovery, was superseded by pas­
sage of the Carmack Amendment.45 
Congress, it reasoned, had responded to the Hughes Court's 
invitation to legislate with respect to this precise issue. Congress 
demonstrated its intent to eliminate the confusion resulting from 
conflicting state laws regarding limited liability contracts by provid­
ing that the terms of the initial carrier's bill of lading would control 
recovery on the shipment. While Congress did not explicitly an­
nounce its intent to usurp state law on the issue, the Adams Express 
Co. Court found that it implicitly did so by announcing a uniform 
policy on the subject.46 The Court, quoting the Georgia Court of 
Appeals, noted the difficulties created by the policy perpetuated in 
the Hughes decision: 
Some States allowed carriers to exempt themselves from all or a 
part of the common law liability, by rule, regulation, or contract; 
others did not; the Federal courts sitting in the various States 
were following the local rule, a carrier being held liable in one 
court when under the same state of facts he would be exempt 
from liability in another; hence this branch of interstate com­
merce was being subjected to such a diversity of legislative and 
judicial holding that it was practically impossible for a shipper 
41. 226 U.S. 491 (1913). 
42. /d. at 501. 
43. See id. at 492-93. 
44. See id. at 497-98. 
45. See id. at 505. 
46. See id. at 505-06. 
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engaged in a business that extended beyond the confines of his 
own State, or for a carrier whose lines were extensive, to know 
without considerable investigation and trouble, and even then 
oftentimes with but little certainty, what would be the carrier's 
actual responsibility as to goods delivered to it for transportation 
from one State to another.47 
The Court held that Congress intended to eliminate this confu­
sion by passing the Carmack Amendment. Immediately following 
the foregoing passage, the Court stated the following: 
That the legislation supersedes all the regulations and policies of 
a particular State upon the same subject results from its general 
character. It embraces the subject of the liability of the carrier 
under a bill of lading which he must issue and limits his power to 
exempt himself by rule, regulation or contract. Almost every de­
tail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no 
rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of 
the subject and supersede all state regulation with reference to 
it.48 
From the standpoint of modern day shippers like Ms. Rini, the 
essential question is the scope of "the subject" referred to by the 
Adams Express Co. Court. The most reasonable reading of the 
words, in the context of the decision, is that they refer to the en­
forceability of a contract between a shipper and a carrier which lim­
its the carrier's liability for loss of goods in exchange for a lower 
shipping cost. There is no indication that the Adams Express Co. 
Court was referring to any other aspect of the shipper-carrier rela­
tionship, particularly not the post-loss claims process. 
C. Application of Preemption Principles to Carmack Cases 
Cases decided by the United States Supreme Court in the years 
immediately following passage of the Carmack Amendment did lit­
tle to clarify the scope of "the subject" referred to in the Adams 
Express Co. decision. In 1914, in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway 
Co. v. Harris ,49 the Court reviewed a Texas statute that allowed 
shippers who sue to recover damages under a bill of lading, to col­
lect attorneys' fees from the carrier as wel1.50 The Harris Court 
47. Id. at 505 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Crenshaw, 5 Ga. App. 675, 687 
(1909)). 
48. Id. at 505-06 (emphasis added). 
49. 234 U.S. 412 (1914). 
50. See id. at 415. Demonstrating a sign of changed times, the attorneys' fees 
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rejected the argument that state statutes permitting recovery of at­
torneys' fees were now preempted by the Carmack Amendment, 
reasoning that statutes did not "enlarge or limit the responsibility of 
the carrier for the loss of property entrusted to it in transporta­
tion."51 The Harris Court remarked that Congress had not acted 
on the question of entitlement to attorneys' fees when goods were 
lost or damaged in interstate commerce, and that unless and until 
Congress acted, state law on the matter was enforceable.52 The 
message of the Harris Court, thus appeared to be that the Carmack 
Amendment preempted only state laws that specifically addressed 
the issue of the amount of recovery shippers were entitled to for the 
loss of their goods and the ability of shippers and carriers to limit 
the carrier's liability for such loss by contract. On the other hand, 
the Harris Court indicated, state laws that allow recovery for losses 
sustained by shippers in addition to the loss of their goods remained 
valid exercises of state power.53 
Nonetheless, a case decided the very next year by the United 
States Supreme Court muddied this message considerably. Charles­
ton & Western Carolina Railway Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co. 54 in­
volved a South Carolina statute that imposed a fifty dollar penalty 
on carriers that failed to pay legitimate claims for loss or damage to 
goods within forty days.55 The Varnville Court determined that this 
statute, which presumably was intended to compensate shippers for 
the inconvenience related to the carriers' delay in resolving their 
claims, was preempted by the Carmack Amendment. The Court 
found the statute to be preempted because the state policy, how­
ever well conceived, went further than Congress intended. The 
Varnville Court said the following of the South Carolina statute: 
The state law was not contrived in aid of the policy of Congress, 
but to enforce a state policy differently conceived; and the fine of 
$50 is enough to constitute a burden. . . . But that is immaterial. 
awarded in this case were only ten dollars. Nonetheless, this recovery was over three 
times the amount of the shipper's actual damages of three dollars. See id. 
51. Id. at 420. 
52. See id. at 422. Congress later acted on the issue of attorneys' fees under the 
Carmack Amendment in cases involving shippers of household goods. See 49 U.S.c. 
§ 11711(d) (1994). However, because Congress never legislated on the matter of attor­
neys' fees in cases involving commercial shippers, state laws providing for awards of 
attorneys' fees are enforceable in those Carmack cases. See A.T. Clayton & Co. v. 
Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 901 F.2d 833, 835 (10th Cir. 1990). 
53. See Harris, 234 U.S. at 420. 
54. 237 U.S. 597 (1915). 
55. See id. at 600-01. 
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When Congress has taken the particular subject-matter in hand 
coincidence is as ineffective as opposition, and a state law is not 
to be declared a help because it attempts to go farther than Con­
gress has seen fit to gO.56 
This language might be interpreted as holding that any state 
statute enhancing the recovery of shippers beyond the value of their 
lost or damaged goods was preempted by the Carmack Amend­
ment; however, the Varnville Court emphasized the continued vital­
ity of the Harris decision.57 In so doing, the Varnville Court 
indicated that the problem with the South Carolina statute was not 
that it increased the shipper's recovery for an injury separate from 
the loss of property, but that it conflicted with the overall scheme of 
recovery set forth in the Carmack Amendment. 
The South Carolina statute involved in Varnville was more 
comprehensive than the Texas statute reviewed in Harris. It im­
posed upon all carriers the burden of identifying which carrier had 
lost or damaged a shipper's goods within forty days, or to pay the 
claim itself. If a carrier failed to either identify the responsible car­
rier or pay the claim within forty days, the carrier was liable to the 
shipper for the fifty dollar penalty.58 This procedure conflicts with 
the one set forth in the Carmack Amendment, which places respon­
sibility for the shipment squarely on the initial carrier.59 
The Carmack Amendment, and the Supreme Court cases that 
were decided in the years immediately following its passage, obvi­
ously preceded the advent of the consumer protection legislation 
that spread throughout the United States in the latter part of this 
century.60 This legislation heightened consumer expectations that 
businesses would deal with consumers in a fair and equitable man­
ner, or face consequences through litigation. Not surprisingly, in 
recent years, the moving industry found itself faced with claims 
based on both state consumer protection legislation and common 
law theories of recovery for related acts. However, the moving in­
dustry has been successful in asserting the Carmack Amendment as 
56. Id. at 604 (citation omitted). 
57. See id. at 603. 
58. See id. at 600-01. 
59. See 49 U.S.c. § 11707 (1994). 
60. See generally MICHAEL C. GILLERAN, THE LAW OF CHAPTER 93A, THE MAS· 
SACHUSElTS CONSUMER AND BUSINESS PROTEcrION Acr § 1.1 (1989). Gilleran notes 
a "sea change" in standards of commercial liability and remarks that every state now 
has a consumer protection law similar to chapter 93A of the General Laws of Massa­
chusetts. See id. at 4. 
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a shield to such suitS.61 
Prior to Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc. ,62 most cases addressing 
the issue of Carmack preemption involved shippers attempting to 
recover damages for carrier negligence during the course of trans­
port.63 Consequently, there was little authority governing the dis­
position of common law claims based on carrier wrongdoing during 
the course of processing claims. Trial court decisions in the District 
of Massachusetts, however, allowed for state law remedies to con­
sumers who suffered injuries separate from the loss or damage to 
their goods.64 
The Rini decision ended that trend with a definitive statement 
61. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Beltman N. Am. Co., 30 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1994); 
Moffit v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 1993); Schultz v. Auld, 848 F. 
Supp. 1497,1506 (D. Idaho 1993); Suarez v. United Van Lines, 791 F. Supp. 815, 817 (D. 
Colo. 1992); Magetson v. United Van Lines, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 917, 922 (D.N.M. 1991); 
Pierre v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1149, 1150-51 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
62. 903 F. Supp. 224, 231 (D. Mass. 1995), rev'd, 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 51 (1997). 
63. See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 970 F.2d 609, 613 
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiffs could not assert a state law negligence claim for 
damaged goods when the driver of a moving van fell asleep on the road); Hughes v. 
United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407, 1415 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff's com­
mon law claims for goods destroyed in a fire on a moving van were preempted); see also 
Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. North Am. Van Lines, 890 F.2d 1112, 1120 (10th 
Cir. 1989) (preempting state law claims for loss or damage to goods); Hopper Furs, Inc. 
v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 749 F.2d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1984) (preempting state law 
claims); W.D. Lawson & Co. v. Penn Cent. Co., 456 F.2d 419, 421 (6th Cir. 1972) (pre­
empting state law claims); ct. Beltman, 30 F.3d at 380 (finding that federal common law 
claim for breach of the contractual obligation of fair dealing was preempted based on 
carrier misconduct during the claims process); Moffit, 6 F.3d at 307 (denying common 
law remedy for late delivery of goods). 
64. The district court decision in Rini allowed Ms. Rini to recover on her state 
law claims because "[t]he Carmack Amendment only provides a remedy for damages 
arising from the loss of goods during transport," and Ms. Rini's state law claims "were 
based on alleged misconduct by United not undertaken in the course of transporting 
goods." Rini, 903 F. Supp. at 231. In addition, two other trial court decisions in the 
District agreed with this reasoning. In Sokhos v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 
1578 (D. Mass. 1988), the court allowed the plaintiff to recover on state law causes of 
action for the mover's late delivery of her belongings and subsequent uncooperative­
ness during the claims process. See id. at 1579-81. Similarly, in Mesta v. Allied Van 
Lines International, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 63 (D. Mass. 1988), the court, although finding 
that the plaintiff's claims for negligence during the transport were preempted by the 
Carmack Amendment, allowed recovery for intransigence during the claims process 
under chapter 93A of the General Laws of Massachusetts. See id. at 64-65. Prior to 
explicitly considering the issue in Rini, the First Circuit implied that it agreed with the 
distinction made by the Rini, Sokhos, and Mesta courts by allowing a plaintiff's recov­
ery on state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of con­
tract to stand, despite the carrier's contention that such claims were preempted by the 
Carmack Amendment. See Fredette v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 66 F.3d 369 (1st Cir. 
1995). 
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from the First Circuit on the issue of Carmack preemption. The 
Rini court determined that any claiin "based on the loss or damage 
[to] goods" was preempted.65 In so deciding, the Rini court ac­
knowledged that there was no legislative history available to steer 
its inquiry regarding the intent of Congress to preempt state law 
claims.66 It also recognized that previous Supreme Court cases did 
not provide clear guidance on the preemptive reach of the Carmack 
Amendment.67 Nonetheless, the Rini court gleaned congressional 
intent to preempt state law remedies from its interpretation of the 
purpose of the statute and the existence of procedural regulations 
governing the claims process.68 It also cited the desirability of uni­
formity within the interstate moving industry as a rationale for its 
decision.69 
With the First Circuit decision, consumers now face a virtually 
insurmountable barrier when they suffer mistreatment at the hand 
of carriers during the claims process. From a consumer protection 
standpoint, this is an unfortunate development because the moving 
industry is now free to deny the legitimate claims of consumers in 
the hopes that they will ultimately abandon them. The carrier may 
remain comfortable in the knowledge that if consumers persist in 
pressing claims, they will only, under the Carmack Amendment, be 
entitled to recover the amount owed at the start of the claims pro­
cessJo From the standpoint of legal analysis, the Rini decision is 
unfortunate because it conflicts substantially with well settled con­
stitutional principles governing federal preemption of state law 
remedies. 
65. Rini, 104 F.3d at 506. The Rini court stated, however, that "liability arising 
from separate harms-apart from the loss or damage to goods-is not preempted." [d. 
The court stated that such liability might arise from a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, but did not specify whether such a claim was preempted if it arose 
from infliction of distress during the claims process. See id. One might expect that 
plaintiffs in Ms. Rini's position will in the future assert claims of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress on the theory that these claims remain redress able under state law. 
66. See id. at 504. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. at 505. 
69. See id. at 507. Regulations governing interstate carriers with regards to the 
procedural requirements for filing and settling claims are set forth at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1005 
(1997). 
70. This is not an unrealistic fear. The factual background of Rini and other Car­
mack preemption cases reflect periodic unscrupulousness by the moving industry in 
resolving consumer claims. See cases cited supra note 24; see also Andrea Adelson, 
Boxing Up a Life and Moving Requires Caution and Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1995, at 
F8 (describing the difficulties and abuse shippers of household goods can encounter 
when submitting a claim). 
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II. THE MISAPPLICATION OF CARMACK PREEMPTION 
A. 	 Comparison of Preemption Principles as Applied to 
Non-Carmack Cases 
As set forth above, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that state common law and statutory remedies remain available, de­
spite the existence of federal legislation in a related area, unless 
Congress has made its intent to preempt clear and manifest.71 By 
joining other circuits to preclude recovery on Ms. Rini's state law 
claims, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit as­
sured that disputes between shippers and carriers of household 
goods will be decided in a manner that does not give proper defer­
ence to the constitutional presumption against preemption. 
It is unquestionable that a circumscribed preemption of state 
law can be inferred from the provision of the Carmack Amendment 
that fixes a carrier's liability for loss or damage of goods to their 
actual value or the declared value of the shipper.72 However, the 
Rini court extended this implicit preemption to bar recovery for all 
injuries that might be incurred during the course of the shipper­
carrier relationship, even when those injuries are separate and dis­
tinct from the loss of goods. Ms. Rini incurred damages during the 
course of a claims process that the trial court found to be egre­
giously unfair and abusive.?3 Despite the Supreme Court's many 
admonitions that state law is not preempted unless Congress has 
made its intention to do so absolutely clear,74 the First Circuit in­
ferred preemption of Ms. Rini's state law remedies for this mis­
treatment in the absence of any meaningful evidence of 
congressional intent to preempt. 
The text of the Carmack AmendmenF5 establishes that the leg­
islation regulates three areas. First, it mandates the initial carrier to 
compensate the shipper if goods are lost or damaged in transit.76 
Second, it provides that the shipper and carrier can contract to limit 
71. 	 See supra Part I.A. 
72. See 49 U.S.C. § 11707(a)(1) (1994). See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 
for the entire text of the Carmack Amendment. 
73. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 224, 227-30 (D. Mass. 1995), 
rev'd, 104 F.3d 502 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 51 (1997). For a discussion of the 
abusive claims process, see supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text. 
74. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme 
Court's stance on preemption. 
75. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23. 
76. See 49 U.S.c. § 11707 (1994). It should be noted that the language of the 
Carmack Amendment is no longer codified within § 11707. However, see supra note 17 
for a discussion of the continued relevance of the Carmack Amendment. 
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the carrier's liability for lost or damaged goods to a declared 
value.77 Third, it prescribes the remedy available for lost or dam­
aged goods when no contractual limitation on liability exists or 
when the contract has been improperly formed. 78 State law regula­
tion on these points is preempted.79 
However, it is a great leap to assume that by regulating these 
three areas Congress intended to sweepingly obliterate claims for 
separate injuries such as Ms. Rini's. Examination of other field pre­
emption cases teaches that courts should carefully examine the ex­
tent of the field occupied and evidence of congressional intention to 
preempt the particular state law claim at issue before inferring the 
existence of preemption.80 State law must have "some direct and 
substantial effect" on the subject of congressional legislation to sup­
port a finding of preemption.81 
This is true even when Congress has enacted complex and 
comprehensive legislation regarding subjects requiring substantial 
regulation and uniformity. For instance, in Silkwood v. Kerr-Mc­
Gee Corp. ,82 the Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended 
to occupy the field of nuclear safety and oust all state law regulation 
in that area.83 However, the Court determined that Congress did 
not intend to preclude all state law remedies, including punitive 
damages, for individuals who suffered radiation injuries, even 
though the award of such damages could conceivably have some 
impact on nuclear safety decisions.84 The Court noted that Con­
gress was silent on this issue when enacting and amending the 
Atomic Energy Act and that it could not assume that Congress in­
tended to preempt state law remedies without comment.85 
77. See id. § 10730(a). Although the Carmack Amendment is no longer codified 
within § 10730, see supra note 17 for a discussion of the amendment's continued 
relevance. 
78. See id. § 11707. Although the Carmack Amendment is no longer codified 
within § 11707, see supra note 17 for a discussion of the amendment's continued 
relevance. 
79. See New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128,131 
(1953) ("With the enactment in 1906 of the Carmack Amendment, Congress [estab­
lished] a nationally uniform policy governing interstate carriers' liability for property 
/oss." (emphasis added)); Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 504-05 (1913). 
80. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 484-86 (1996); Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Silkwood v, Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U,S. 
238, 248 (1984), 
81. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 85 (1990). 
82. 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
83. See id. at 250. 
84. See id. at 251-52. 
85. See id. at 251. Specifically, the Court stated that congressional silence on the 
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Most recently, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,86 the Supreme Court 
held that a comprehensive federal statute governing the regulation 
of medical devices did not preempt state law product liability 
claims. Despite the existence of substantial federal control over 
marketing and development of medical devices, the Court noted 
that preemption of such claims would have "the perverse effect of 
granting complete immunity from design defect liability to an entire 
industry that, in the judgment of Congress, needed more stringent 
regulation in order 'to provide for the safety and effectiveness of 
medical devices intended for human use.' "87 
Cases from the federal courts of appeals also demonstrate that 
courts should carefully parse federal statutes for evidence of con­
gressional intent to preempt. This should be done in order to avoid 
applying preemption principles to matters that Congress failed to 
address. For example, in Tousley v. North American Van Lines, 
Inc. ,88 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
examined the interplay between a state statute governing pre-con­
tract negotiations between a lessor and a motor carrier, and the 
provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act governing formation of 
a motor carrier's lease agreement.89 The South Carolina statute at 
issue placed a number of requirements on entrepreneurs selling 
business opportunities, and had the "obvious purpose of ... 
alert[ing] South Carolina citizens to the possibility that investments 
in business ventures may be ill-conceived and to provide some pro­
tection from unscrupulous promoters. "90 The Fourth Circuit deter­
mined that while the Interstate Commerce Act addressed the issue 
of contract formation between motor carrier lessors and lessees, it 
did not address the pre-contract behavior governed by the South 
Carolina statute.91 Although the Interstate Commerce Commission 
stated, when adopting the regulations at issue, that it was leaving 
'" [l]essors and lessees ... completely free to bargain at arm's length 
and negotiate the sale or rental of any products, equipment, or serv­
ices,'" the Tousley court did not find that this rose to the level of 
issue "takes on added significance in light of Congress' failure to provide any federal 
remedy for persons injured by [tortious] conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress 
would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by 
illegal conduct." [d. 
86. 518 U.S. 470 (1996). 
87. !d. at 487. 
88. 752 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1985). 
89. See id. at 103. 
90. [d. at 100. 
91. See id. at 101. 
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the "clear and manifest" expression of congressional intent neces­
sary for a finding of preemption of state law governing contract ne­
gotiations.92 Under those circumstances, the court found that 
South Carolina retained the right to legislate in this area. The 
Tousley court also noted that the two statutes served the same pur­
pose of assuring fairness in the relationship of carriers and lessors, 
and therefore complemented each other.93 
Before deciding Rini, the First Circuit applied a similarly care­
ful analysis to a preemption case. In Schafer v. American Cyanamid 
Co. ,94 the court determined that a comprehensive federal statute 
governing remedies for vaccine-related injuries did not specifically 
address the question of loss of consortium claims for family mem­
bers of those injured by vaccines.95 In that case, the First Circuit 
would not infer congressional intent to preempt state law claims for 
such losses, despite the strong federal interest in limiting the liabil­
ity of vaccine manufacturers so they would continue making this 
important product.96 In his concurring opinion, Judge Stahl stated 
that this conclusion was unavoidable because of the court's "cir­
cumscribed scope of ... authority," but encouraged Congress to act 
if it did not concur in the result.97 
When the analysis employed in these cases is applied to the 
dispute between Ms. Rini and United, it seems evident that the 
Carmack Amendment should not have preempted Ms. Rini's state 
law claims. The Carmack Amendment says nothing about injuries 
inflicted by carriers on shippers that are separate and distinct from 
the loss of goods, or even about the claims process itself.98 This 
should have prevented a finding of preemption iJ;l Rini, because as 
the First Circuit itself stated, a congressional act should not be read 
to preempt state law through silence.99 Preemption is particularly 
counter-indicated when, as here, "the state law at issue creates a 
remedy unavailable under federallaw."loo 
There is no legislative history supporting the conclusion that 
92. Id. at 102. 
93. See id. 
94. 20 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994). 
95. See id. at 7. 
96. See id. at 6-7. In fact, the court stated that "[p]re-emption law ... cautions us 
against finding that a congressional act pre-empts a state law through silence." [d. at 6. 
97. Id. at 7 (Stahl, J., concurring). 
98. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23. 
99. See Schafer, 20 F.3d at 6. 
100. Id. (citing Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984)). 
306 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:289 
Congress intended to preempt state law claims like Ms. Rini's,l°l In 
fact, the existing history indicates that Congress aimed to resolve 
entirely different problems through enactment of the Carmack 
Amendment.102 Without the availability of state law remedies, Ms. 
Rini was left with no judicial recourse for the injuries she suffered 
during the claims process. Under these circumstances, there does 
not appear to be a "clear and manifest" intent to preempt state 
law,l03 
B. Preservation of Uniformity 
The Rini court cited the desirability of uniformity for carriers 
as a factor in its decision that Ms. Rini's state law claims were pre­
empted.104 However, for the uniformity argument to support a 
finding of preemption, the court must determine that either it is 
impossible to comply with both state and federal law or that state 
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes 
of Congress. lOS 
The text of the Carmack Amendment fully reveals the extent 
of the uniformity Congress sought when it enacted the legislation. 
Congress intended that shippers whose goods were lost in transit 
should not have to track down which of several interstate carriers 
lost them in order to recover for their loss. It also intended to per­
mit carriers to contract to limit liability, despite state law to the 
contrary. In addition, it intended that, in the absence of a properly 
formed contractual limit on liability, shippers should be allowed to 
recover for the actual loss of their goodS.106 
The Rini decision has transformed the uniformity created over 
the regulated areas of the Carmack Amendment into complete im­
munity for anything that occurs in the course of the shipper-carrier 
relationship. Certainly, if Congress had intended this result, it 
would have said SO.107 
101. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
102. See supra Part I.B. 
103. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
104. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 505 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
118 S. Ct. 51 (1997); see also Cleveland v. Beltman N. Am. Co., 30 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 
1994) (noting the importance of the Carmack Amendment in preserving uniformity for 
interstate carriers). 
105. See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23. 
107. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,487, 491 (1996); see also English, 
496 U.S. at 83 (remarking that Congress could not have intended to preempt state law 
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims when the implication would be that an 
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In Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. Harris,108 the 
Supreme Court made clear that the uniformity sought by Congress 
when it enacted the Carmack Amendment was not a barrier to en­
forcing any and all state laws in some way related to interstate ship­
ment of household goods. In Harris, the Court held that states 
were free to enact general legislation to compensate shippers for 
damages they incurred as a result of carrier recalcitrance, because 
this did not interfere with the federal scheme.109 Similarly, allowing 
shippers to recover for abusive claims processes would not interfere 
with the federal scheme governing recovery for the loss of goods. 
This is particularly true since carriers are uniquely able to avoid the 
liability that follows from acts involved in cases like Rini. Carriers 
can avoid the unpredictability related to state law claims by resolv­
ing shippers' claims fairly and expeditiously. Unfortunately, unsus­
pecting shippers cannot so easily avoid injuries like the ones 
suffered by Ms. Rini. In any event, it is reasonable to assume that if 
Congress intended to grant carrier immunity for misconduct during 
the claims process in order to assure them of uniformity, it would 
have expressly stated so. 
C. Effect of Regulations on Preemption Finding 
The Rini court cited the existence of regulations governing the 
claims process as guiding its inference that Congress intended to 
preempt all state law claims related to the loss or damage of 
goods.1IO However, the existence of even extensive regulations do 
not support a conclusion that state law remedies are preempted. Ill 
Again, intent is the touchstone of the preemption analysis.112 The 
presumption against preemption is strengthened when the federal 
regulations and state law supplement each other to accomplish the 
same purpose.113 Here, enforcement of the federal regulations and 
state law both seek to promote fairness in the claims process, and 
thus complement, rather than conflict with, each other. 
employer could "retaliate against a nuclear whistle-blower by hiring thugs to assault the 
employee on the job" without being answerable to state law). 
108. 234 U.S. 412 (1914). 
109. See id. at 421-22; see also A.T. Clayton & Co. v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas 
R.R., 901 F.2d 833, 835 (10th Cir. 1990). 
110. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 505 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
118 S. Ct. 51 (1997). 
111. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 498-500; English, 496 U.S. at 87 (1990). 
112. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
113. See Tousley v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 752 F.2d 96, 102-03 (4th Cir. 
1985). 
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Examination of the Interstate Commerce Commission regula­
tions covering the claims process demonstrates that they do not 
have a preemptive effect on state law. The regulations include 
some basic procedural aspects of the claims process. For instance, a 
claim must be in writing, the carrier must establish individual claims 
files, and the carrier must pay, decline to payor make a compro­
mise settlement within a specified amount of time.1l4 These regula­
tions are, in all respects, completely compatible with the 
requirements of Massachusetts law.1l5 
Another strong consideration in the preemption analysis is an 
agency's own approach to the preemptive effect of its regulations. 
[B]ecause agencies normally address problems in a detailed man­
ner and can speak through a variety of means, ... we can expect 
that they will make their intentions clear if they intend for their 
regulations to be exclusive. Thus, if an agency does not speak to 
the question of pre-emption, we will pause before saying that the 
mere volume and complexity of its regulations indicate that the 
agency did in fact intend to pre-empt.1l6 
The claims process regulations, which were passed in 1972, are 
silent on the issue of preemption. The ICC did not state any inten­
tion to preempt state law in its introductory statement to the new 
regulations.1l7 The failure to speak on the subject reflects that the 
ICC did not intend the regulations to have a preemptive effect. 
Moreover, it is not dispositive on the issue of preemption that 
the ICC had the authority to sanction carriers who violate the regu­
lations. The existence of these powers does not oust all potential 
state law remedies. State law claims and federal enforcement pow­
ers are presumed to exist side by side.118 
III. CONCLUSION 
The view of Carmack preemption taken by the Rini court ap­
pears inconsistent with the general principles of preemption, as ap­
114. See 49 C.F.R. pt. 1005 (1997). 
115. Interestingly, little of the conduct viewed by the Rini trial court judge as 
"egregious" and "unfair" is specifically addressed by the regulations, which belies a 
construction of the regulations as comprehensive. See supra notes 1-16 and accompa­
nying text for a discussion of United's behavior and the trial court's ruling. 
116. California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987) 
(quoting Hillsbourough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718 
(1985)). 
117. See 37 Fed. Reg. 4257 (1972). 
118. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 461 U.S. 238, 254 (1984). 
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plied by the United States Supreme Court and by the First Circuit 
itself in other preemption cases. It may be that the Adams Express 
Co. v. Croninger119 Court's statement in 1913 that "[a]lmost every 
detail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no 
rational doubt that Congress intended to take possession of the sub­
ject and supersede all state regulation with reference to it,"120 was 
the death knell for all consumers seeking remedies against unscru­
pulous interstate carriers for the future. Although the Adams Ex­
press Co. Court surely was not considering the relationship between 
the Carmack Amendment and consumer protection acts that would 
be enacted many years later, this statement has created an impossi­
ble barrier for those seeking an exception to federal preemption. 
Unfortunately, because of this statement by a Court sitting 
long ago, the moving industry has been able to exempt itself from 
the requirements of good faith and fair dealing with its customers, 
by asserting immunity from state law claims based on implicit pre­
emption by the Carmack Amendment. Given the Supreme Court's 
recent decision not to take certiorari in Rini, it is unlikely that this 
problem will ever be resolved by judicial means. 
Now what probably has always been the best means of exacting 
fairness from the moving industry has become the only means. 
Since consumers have no access to state law remedies designed to 
protect them from unscrupulous businesses, Congress should act 
quickly to insure more stringent regulation of the moving industry's 
claims process practices and to provide consequences for violations 
that have bite. Congress has a number of options available in this 
regard. It could explicitly state that it does not intend to preempt 
state law remedies and restore the ability of consumers to bring 
state common law and statutory claims when they have been 
wronged by interstate carriers in the course of settling a claim. Al­
ternatively, Congress could create an administrative system, provid­
ing consumers with a reasonably swift and effective means of 
resolving their complaints against recalcitrant moving companies. 
Regardless of the method chosen, the moving industry should not 
be allowed to continue to ride roughshod over its customers, with 
no consequence for any longer than the time it takes to pass such 
legislation. 
119. 226 U.S. 491 (1913). 
120. Id. at 505-06. 
